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Are you SURE you want to waste policy chances?
Waste generation, landfill diversion and environmental
policy effectiveness in the EU15

Valentina IAFOLLA, Massimiliano MAZZANTI, Francesco NICOLLI1

Abstract
We empirically test delinking of waste dynamics with regard to economic growth and the
effectiveness of environmental and specific waste-related policies, by exploiting a newly
constructed, integrated waste-economic-policy dataset based on official data for the EU15 for
1995-2007. We find that absolute delinking for waste generation is far from being achieved in the
EU despite fairly stringent and longstanding policy commitment that goes back to the mid 1990s,
but which however is biased towards waste management and waste disposal rather than waste
prevention. Policy as well as country structural factors seem to impact instead on landfill
diversion. Nevertheless, country heterogeneity matters: SURE based analyses show that EU
average figures often hide high variance. Their results provide food for thought for a future most
comprehensive EU waste policy strategy, which is now aimed mainly at landfill diversion, within
a framework strongly oriented to allowing countries to decide about the implementation of EU
directives.
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1. Introduction and relevant frameworks
Over the last 20 years, European environmental policies have become more oriented towards
reducing the amount of municipal solid waste (MSW) landfilled and the promotion of other
forms of waste disposal, such as recycling and incineration. In this context, decoupling or
delinking, that is, improvements in environmental/resource indicators with respect to economic
activity indicators, is increasingly used to evaluate progress in the use/conservation of natural and
environmental resources. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development is
doing extensive work on decoupling indicators for reporting and policy evaluation purposes
(OECD, [57]). Various decoupling or resource efficiency indicators are included in the European
Environment Agency’s (EEA) state-of-the-environment reports (EEA, [24], [25]), and a few
European countries have begun to include indicators of delinking in official analyses of
environmental performance (DEFRA/DTI, [18]). Furthermore, (EEA ETC/RWM, [26])
highlights the importance of market based instruments for achieving a higher degree of delinking
for waste indicators. The European Union (EU) policy thematic strategies on resources and
waste, include reference to absolute and relative delinking indicators (EEA, [22]; Jacobsen et al.,
[37]). The former is a negative relationship between economic growth and environmental
impacts, associated with the descending side of an inverted U-shape, according to the
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) framework. The latter, the ascending side of the U-shape, is
a positive, but decreasing in size, income-environment relationship. This represents a positive
lower than unity elasticity in economic terms. There is no delinking observed on the ascending
part of the EKC and, in addition, there is unity or higher than unity elasticity. The EKC literature
has moved from basic conceptual intuitions and stylised/empirical facts, which traditionally fed
EKC analysis, to the search for theoretical foundations. An extensive overview of the main
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theoretical issues (first developed by Andreoni and Levison, [3])2 can be found in Brock and
Taylor [8]. The field of economics of waste includes studies that date back before the 1980s
(Richardson and Havlicek, [61]; Choe and Fraser, [13]; Beede and Bloom, [7]), and which
increasingly emphasize policy aspects (Palmer et al., [58]; Walls and Palmer, [68]). Due to data
availability, applied analysis has lagged behind theoretical analysis until recently (Johnstone and
Labonne, [38]).
Increased delinking is the primary aim for waste, which, in terms of its environmental impacts
and economic costs, is no less relevant than climate change and is also related to it given the
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions generated by various disposal options (Andersen et al., [1]).
Andersen et al. [2] estimates waste trends for the EU-15 and the EU-10 new entrants, and finds
that waste generation is linked to economic activities by non-constant trend ratios. This rather
descriptive analysis of delinking in EU countries forecasts increased relative delinking; it does not
confirm the EKC evidence. Projections for 2005-2020 for the UK, France and Italy, show
growth in MSW of around 15-20 per cent, which, at least at first sight, may be compatible with
relative delinking with respect to GDP (gross domestic product) and consumption growth.
Figures 1-2 show the state of the art in the EU regarding waste generation and landfilling across
countries.

2

Then other works followed in providing theoretical explanations for the EKC (among others Kelly, [41]; Chimeli

and Braden, [11], [12]).
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Figure 1 - MSW generation in Europe. 1995-2007. (1000= 1Million tons)

Source: Eurostat

Figure 2 - MSW landfilled in Europe as share of total waste management. 1995-2007.

Source: Eurostat

EEA [22] shows that countries can be categorised under three waste management groupings,
based on the strategies for diverting municipal waste away from landfill, and the relative shares of
5
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landfilling, materials recovery (mainly recycling and composting) and incineration. A first
grouping comprises countries with high levels of both materials recovery and incineration, and
relatively low levels of landfill, a second grouping includes countries with high materials recovery
rates, medium incineration levels and medium dependence on landfill, while the third group of
countries has low levels of both materials recovery and incineration, and relatively high
dependence on landfill (EEA, [23]). Although costs and benefits should be evaluated specifically
for each situation, the environmental impacts of landfilling and waste sites mostly in urban areas
are massive (Pearce, [59]; Eshet et al., [28]; Ilhanfeldt and Taylor, [35]; Jenkins et al., [39]; Seok
Lim and Missios, [63]; Lang, [43]). And although recycling is at the top of the EU’s
environmental waste hierarchy, it should not be taken by default as best economic practice in all
situations; its costs and benefits are influenced by economic and technological factors. For
examples of economic assessments of different waste disposal strategies, see Pearce [59] and
Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh [19] among others. The focus has shifted over the last 3-4 years to the
role of waste in production and consumption processes and how prevention of waste and better
waste management can contribute to more sustainable outcomes.
In the long run, waste reduction at source, through the imposition of policy targets in terms of
waste generated per capita, is probably the most effective and most efficient answer to the
problem. Given the potentially high costs in the short run and resistance from member states, the
first phase of policy implementation at EU level focuses on landfill diversion and increased
shares of recycling/recovery, including incineration. For the purposes of our analysis, which
focuses on the income-waste relationship in specific states as well as the average EU relationship,
it is worth noting that members states, following the guidelines in the 2008 new waste framework
directive3, are expected to set up and propose to the EU Commission a waste policy strategy that

3

Even the revised 2008 Waste Framework Directive, which was expected eventually to include some per capita
targets for MSW generation, although it explicitly reassesses the objective of delinking and the necessity for using
economic policy instruments to tackle waste externalities according to relative social costs, does not ultimately fix
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includes waste prevention, by 2013. This might even include waste generation per capita targets,
currently in place only in Hungary and the region of Flanders in Belgium. Country based
evidence is a necessary piece of the puzzle. It should be noted also that the EU Belgian
presidency in 2009 launched an agenda based on the objectives of a ‘EU recycling society’ and a
EU green economy. The attention on waste management and waste policy will increase.
In light of future scenarios, there is a real need to analyse empirically whether the policies
implemented so far have been effective in changing the endogenous relationship between
economic growth and waste trends. In other words, given that waste policies are motivated by
the various negative externalities arising at different stages of the life cycle (at source, at disposal
level), ex ante cost-benefit analysis would provide indications about the most effective option to
pursue and the right level of tax to impose. Ex post effectiveness analysis would assess the short
and long run effects of policies on the ultimate objective (IVM, [36]): to drive down the waste
Kuznets curve (WKC). In the absence of effective policies, we can expect a somewhat linear
positive relationship between waste generation and growth, with landfill diversion being affected
only by market prices and the opportunity costs (of land).
Delinking trends in industrial materials and energy have been scrutinised in the advanced
countries for several decades (for examples of early work on development and environment see
Tilton [67] on metals/materials, and Martin [48] on energy for an extensive review). In the 1990s,
research on delinking was extended to include air pollution and GHG emissions, including
analyses of the relationship between pollution and economic growth, which are encompassed in
the EKC.

waste prevention targets. Art. 9 on waste prevention sets future actions only in terms of stating that by the end of
2014, waste prevention and decoupling objectives for 2020 will be presented, and art. 29 indicates that countries
should prepare waste prevention programmes by 2013 (the EEA is required to report annually on this evolution
from 2008 to 2013), with delinking performance to be evaluated every 6 years. It seems clear that absolute delinking
for MSW generation is not present, and EU member countries have managed to postpone specific waste generation
per capita targets.

7
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In the waste realm, delinking analyses are still scarce. One of the earliest WKC studies is Cole
et al. [16], which finds no evidence of an inverted U-shape in relation to municipal waste.
Fischer-Kowalski and Amann [29] analysed the richer OECD countries, over the period 19751995, and found that absolute delinking holds for landfilled waste, but not waste generated. This
suggests, as can be seen from the descriptive analyses, that the evidence for waste generation and
waste disposal varies, depending on improved performance in waste recovery. A study by
Johnstone and Labonne [38] uses a panel database on solid waste in the OECD countries to
provide evidence on the economic and demographic determinants of rates of household solid
waste generation, regressed over consumption expenditure, urbanisation and population density.
Kaurosakis [40] deals with policy evaluation, and presents evidence on the determinants of waste
generation and the driving forces behind the proportions of paper and glass that are recycled,
and the proportion of waste that goes to land-fill. Recent studies by Mazzanti and Zoboli [51]
analyse EU-15 and EU-25 panel data for all waste trends (from generation to landfill, including
recycling and incineration) for 1995–2005, and find some weak evidence of delinking and signs
of policy effectiveness; others focus on the international and policy relevant issue of transboundary shipments of waste (Baggs, [5]). From a regional studies and trade based perspective,
spatial issues are attracting the attention of researchers (Ley et al., [44]; Mazzanti et al., [54]).
Recent studies on waste and environmental policy are collected in Mazzanti and Montini (50).
This article provides empirical evidence on delinking trends for MSW generated and MSW
landfilled, using both fixed effect models and seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE).
The importance of this analysis is huge: on the one hand it provides a deeper investigation into
delinking trends in waste sector across European countries and on the other it provides ex-post
evaluation of different policy related variables. In addition, it includes a novel application of
SURE models to delinking analysis in the waste sector that takes account of slope heterogeneity.
The main attractions of Zellner’s [69] SURE is that it make it possible to exploit cross sectional
correlation in the panel (if present), estimating single equations for each individual country. This
8
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enables us to correct for the presence of contemporaneous correlations across cross sectional
units allowing the slope to change across different individuals. In addition to the important
statistical implications of this estimator, the real value of SURE in this field is the possibility to
account for slope heterogeneity, which enables a deeper understanding of the different
behaviours of different countries, based on country level evidence of delinking. Our analysis is
thus developed along three steps. In the first step we apply a traditional fixed effects model then,
after testing for cross sectional correlation,4 in the second step we apply SURE (if necessary) first
constraining all slopes to be equal, and finally we allow slopes to change across individuals in the
third step. Comparison of the results provides an in depth understanding of the delinking
process, and especially of the differences in delinking trends across countries.
The literature includes examples of delinking studies that use SURE or a random-coefficients
linear regression model (Swamy, [66]), in order to account for the presence of slope
heterogeneity. One well known example is List and Gallet [45], who using a long dataset on
NOx and SO2 per capita emissions for US countries during the period 1929-1994, tested for the
presence of an EKC, using a fixed effects model and then applying SURE. Allowing for slope
heterogeneity, they find very different turning points with respect to the aggregate analysis, with
on average higher turning points for NOx and lower for SO2. Cole [14], using fixed effects and
random coefficients estimators, study the relationship between income and three different
pollutants: NOx for the years 1975,1980,1985 and 1990; SO2 and CO2 for 1984-2000, for a wide
group of countries. Cole finds different results from the two estimation techniques used: he
emphasises that allowing for slope heterogeneity in the panel may alter the results of the simple
fixed effects model. Using random coefficients models he finds evidence of an EKC only for
one pollutant (NOx), while fixed effects shows evidence of EKC for all the pollutants he studies.

4

As mentioned before, SUR estimators correct for the presence of cross sectional correlation in the panel. For this
reason after the fixed effects estimation we present some tests for cross sectional dependence, including the Breuschpagan statistic for cross-sectional independence in the residuals of a fixed effect regression model (Greene, [31]), and
a similar test proposed by Pesaran [60], more suitable for panels with small T and large N.
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He also finds a significant difference in slope coefficients among different countries, confirming
his hypothesis that a single slope model may pose too strong a restriction on the data. Halkos
[33], exploiting a dataset used also by Stern and Common [64], tests for the presence of EKC in
SO2 emissions during the period 1960-90, for 73 OECD and non-OECD countries.
A compelling recent study using SURE is by Martinez-Espineira and Lantz [49], who use the
traditional EKC framework to study bird abundance in nine Canadian provinces, during the
period 1968-2007, using a seemingly unrelated regressions approach. They find significant
heterogeneity among provinces in relation to bird abundance: some of them see a turning point
after 30,000 dollars, while in others the threshold is between 10,000 and 20,000 dollars. Also, in
this case, slope heterogeneity is significant, confirming the hypothesis that within single states
there may be considerable differences in environmental performances.
The original aim of our analysis is to bring together delinking analysis and policy assessment.
Policy efforts are analysed in terms of their effectiveness in reducing waste generation, on the
basis of the actions taken in response to the implementation of the policies relevant to the case
considered here: namely the 1999 Landfill and Incineration Directives,5 and more generally the
commitment and effort of EU countries to implementing waste policies, including early ‘policy
actions’ with regard to formal policy ratification, by some countries (e.g. Germany, Austria put in
place a packaging waste management system).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the empirical model. We
stress the uniqueness of a long panel and merged data at world level for waste, and the relevance
of testing both official EUROSTAT environmental policy indicators and newly constructed –

5

The Landfill Directive adopts two approaches: first it introduces stringent technical requirements for landfills;
second, it diverts biodegradable municipal waste (BMW) from landfills by setting targets for the landfill of
Biodegradable municipal Waste (BMW) in 2006, 2009 and 2016. The Incineration Directive (2000/76/EC on the
incineration of waste) is an ancillary and complementary piece of EU waste policy strategy which includes the
Waste Framework Directive, legislation that was revised at the end of 2008, but which still does not identify clear
policy targets.
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from EU waste official sources – indexes of policy stringency. Section 3 presents main results
for the fixed effects and SURE models. Section 4 concludes, commenting on results with policy
implications.

2. Data and empirical model
We exploit a dataset composed of the 15 European countries (EU15), for the period 1995-2007
to test delinking paths and the effectiveness of policy, controlling for socio economic and
structural factors, in determining waste performances6. The two dependent variables are MSW
collected, and solid waste landfilled, expressed in per capita ratios derived from EUROSTAT.
Our main economic driver, as in other WKC studies, is data on final consumption expenditure
by households, because this is considered to be better than GDP in this kind of study. Estimates
(not shown) that exploit GDP present very similar results: this is a kind of sensitivity test. We
include some other variables to control for socio-economic and policy aspects. First, population
density since it is likely to impact on waste generation – with ambiguous sign given that
urbanisation forces could drive up generation while economies of scale may after some point of
waste quantity drive down collection of waste - and negatively on waste landfilled at micro and
macroeconomic levels. In terms of construction of the policy indices, we exploit the country fact
sheets available at EIONET7 to compile an original index of policy stringency, which,
interestingly, varies over time and across countries, and EUROSTAT data relative to the total
amount of environmental taxation (not energy) per GDP in European countries. The index
constructed (fig. 3) is a proxy for national policies for the time period examined. It captures all
possible information on national implementation of waste related policies (MSW, packaging

6 We do not use EU27 data given the current lower availability and reliability of waste data for ‘newcomers’ eastern
EU countries.
7 EIONET is a partnership agency of the EEA and its member countries; it is fundamental to the collection and
organisation of data for the EEA.
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waste, end of life vehicles, landfill taxation etc.). We use the country studies available at
EIONET as our information source. This index is extremely comprehensive with regard to
landfill directive related variables,8 and captures some of the waste prevention features of
national policies.9 It is consistent with a comprehensive environmental policy approach, which is
not based on single economic instrument, discussed theoretically by Walls and Palmer [69].
Figure 3 – The policy index

Source: own calculation on EIONET data

We introduce total number of environmental management system (EMS) certifications, a
factor that indirectly capture some effects of the packaging directive effects on firm behaviour
8 Thus, in any given year, each country is associated with an index value, where 1 is the maximum potential value
(assuming the presence of all the policies considered). We differentiate between the presence of a strategy (low value)
and an effective regulatory policy (high value). The latter is assigned a bigger weight (0 for no policy, 1 for strategy
only, 2 for a policy). Prominent examples of overall environmental policy performance indices, for several countries,
based on a synthesis of diverse policy performances, can be found in Eliste and Fredrikkson [27] and Dasgupta et al.
[17]. Cagatay and Mihci ([9]; [10]) provide an index of environmental sensitivity performance for 1990-1995, for
acidification, climate change, water and even waste management.
9 Altthough specific waste prevention targets/actions do not exist, (landfill related) policy variables can be included
even at this level of analysis. We can hypothesise that the backward effects of landfill policies and waste management
actions on the amounts of MSW generated are not significant. Nevertheless, since our synthetic policy index also
captures the variety of waste measures implemented by a country in addition to landfill diversion actions, some
effects may emerge.
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or, more generally, ‘market innovativeness’ in the waste management practices characterising a
country. Environmental certification is often tested as a possible driver of environmental
performance (Arimura et al., [4]; Barla, [6]). This is a more a market based factor linked to the
techno-organisational innovation process eventually influencing environmental performances,
and eventually responding to regulatory pressure. Future applied work should test also whether
other market based factors such as market structure are relevant for explaining waste
performances (Fleckinger and Glachant, [30]).
The data we use derive mainly from EUROSTAT structural indicators datasets, and are
summarised in Table 1 which highlights the main research hypotheses.
The specification that we test is a common EKC based (Cole et al., [15] Stern and Common,
[65]; Maddison, [46]) reduced form (for waste related studies, see Dijkgraaf and Gradus, [20],
[21]; Mazzanti and Zoboli, [51]). We do not include a third term in the income-environment
polynomial due to its irrelevance in the waste framework (at best the presence of relative
delinking is proved ):
(1) Log (Waste per capita performance indicator10) = β0i + αt + β1Log(C) it + β2Log(C)2 it + β3(Xi) it
+ β4(Zi) it + eit
where X includes socio-economic/structural factors (DENSPOP) and Z includes policy/market
levers (POLIND, ENVTAX, and EMAS). The relation is estimated first with the fixed effects
model then with the SURE technique, constraining all the slopes in a first phase and setting
them free to change across individual estimations in the second step.11 The analysis is conducted

10

Either landfilled waste or waste generated in our paper. Incinerated waste is not included due to lower coverage
even in the EU15.
11 In this last step we voluntarily dropped 3 countries, in order to allow estimation of the SURE model with
unconstrained slopes. This is because we have a relatively small T and without the exclusion of at least 3 countries it
would not be possible to estimate this last regression. For this reason, in the first phase of the work, we dropped all
observation relating to the 3 countries with the lowest amounts of waste generation, and the three countries with the
lowest levels amount of waste landfilled in the second phase of the analysis.
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first using MSW as the dependent variable and then MSW landfilled, in order to assess the trends
in two of the main variables in waste management. Wherever possible, logarithmic values are
used.
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics and summary of research hypotheses
Variables
Dependent
Variable

MSW generation
MSW landfilled

Acronyms
MSWGENER
MSWLAND

Units of
measurement

Mean

Min

Max

[Kg/capita]

545.26

302

804

[Kg/capita]

228.91

3

554.1

Economic
drivers

Consumption

CONS

[€ per
inhabitant]

13,663

5,700

28,400

Structural
Variable

Population density

DENSPOP

[inhabitants/
Km2]

157.06

16.8

484.2

Policy
Variables

Waste-related policy
Environmental tax

POLIND
ENVTAX

0.45
1.19

0
0.25

0.95
3.90

Market
variable

EMS innovation

EMS

0.014

0

0.183

0-1 index
% National
consumption

Research
Hypotheses

Linear or
quadratic
(inverted U)
shape
MSW-GENER:
either positive
or negative
effects can be
expected
depending on
economies of
scale vs
opportunity cost
of waste
management
MSW-LAND:
negative
correlation
mostly expected
due to economic
and
environmental
external and
opportunity
costs of
landfilling
Negative
correlation12

12

Although positive correlation between policies and country environmental commitment can be and were found,
dependent on endogeneity of policy action with respect to income level, the production of public environmental
goods being a public good and luxury goods being helped by income conditions and by the health of public finances.
Vicious or virtuous circles thus are possible paths in the environmental-income dynamics.
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3. Econometric evidence
3.1 Waste generation drivers
In the fixed effects analysis (results in Table 2), the core specification shows a relative delinking
associated with a quite low elasticity with respect to previous estimates, which remains in the
range 0.31 to 0.38 across all the specifications tested.13 This may be preliminary evidence that the
EU 15 group is still far from absolute delinking, although progress is being made towards
delinking.14 In any case, this may be seen as a problematic result, considering that on the one
side, waste prevention is at the top of EU waste hierarchy along with recycling, and on the other
side and even more important, prevention at source is probably the most effective way of
promoting waste management sustainability. Moving to the socio economic control, we see that
population density is never statistically significant. Also not significant are the three policy
variables tested: policy index, environmental taxation and EMAS certification as market/policy
lever. Similarly, we expect the total amount of environmental taxes to be negatively correlated to
the total amount of waste generated and positively to landfill diversion. We have the same
expectations for EMAS certification. Nevertheless, this result is not unexpected, considering that
waste policies do not put specific emphasis on waste prevention but are usually seen as an
instrument to optimise waste management systems. Similarly, the amount of environmental taxes,
which could be considered a proxy for commitment to environmental issues, does not alter the
Kuznets delinking relation, which is in line with the lack of specific emphasis on waste
prevention in these policy efforts.15 Finally, EMAS certification was expected to have a positive
correlation to waste prevention, being a proxy for product innovation and environmentally

13

The squared term is not presented because it is never statistically significant.
Mazzanti et al., [52] found an elasticity of 0.772, using Eurostat Data from 1995 to 2005. The inclusion of years
2006 and 2007 reduces the income/waste elasticity, showing an improvement in environmental performances at the
EU15 level.
15 Moreover, a huge part of this variable is related to landfill tax in most countries. In Italy, e.g., 80% of such
environmental taxation is linked to landfill tax revenues, as national statistical data show. In general, in the EU
landfill tax comprises the major share of environmental taxes. One famous example is the UK landfill tax introduced
in 1999 (Morris et al., [55]; Martin and Scott, [47]).
14
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oriented production, but this variable is not significant. One reason may be the high variance of
this factor in the EU, with Germany a clear outlier and other countries lagging behind with
relatively new adoption dating only from the late 1990s – early 2000s for most. To deal with the
endogeneity of policy commitment with regard to income levels we implement three different
consistency tests, presented in Table A2 in the appendix. In the first two we used respectively
the first and the second lag of POLIND as the policy proxy, in the third we instrument POLIND
with its lag. Tests confirm the results obtained in the main analysis.
Table 2 - Waste Generation: Fixed effect model
FEM

FEM

FEM

FEM

CONS
DENSPOP
POLIND
EMS
ENVTAX

0.35***
0.18
…
…
…

0.38***
0.17
-0.02
…
…

0.33***
0.26
…
0.17
…

0.31***
0.28
…
…
-0.04

Pesaran test16
F test

0.0088
0.0000

0.0090
0.0000

0.4601
0.0000

0.0024
0.0000

Note: In all the estimation we use the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance adjusted for correlations in the error terms over time within
individuals (but not across individuals). This means that we consider that Var(εit) = σ2εit i=1,.., N, t=1,…,T, and that Cov(εit, εis) ≠ 0
t ≠ s.
(…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; F test shows overall significance for all
regressions; R-squared presents reasonably high values for panel settings. EMAS data are available only for the period 1997-2007, and EMAS
estimation does not include Germany because it is a strong outlier. Environmental tax data are not available for year 1995.

The results of the Pesaran (presented in Table 2) and Breusch-Pagan (presented in Table 3) tests
show that the residual of the fixed effects model are affected by contemporaneous correlations
across cross-sectional units, which can be exploited by techniques such as SURE models, which
allow efficiency gains. Table 3 summarises the regression results from the first of the two SURE
models for waste generation. This is a first possible model in which we constrain all the slopes to
being equal; a kind of fixed effects with serial correction which is usually implemented in the
econometric literature to cope with correlations remaining within a framework of homogeneous
slope.

16

Breusch pagan test results, not shown for reasons of space, are consistent with these results.

16
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As we can see this ‘correction’ does not alter significantly the economic and statistical meaning of
previous results.17 Some new insights emerge however. If on the one hand, both specifications we
test show significance of the squared term, demonstrating a Kuznets like path, this is nonetheless
associated with a very high, and clearly ‘out of range with respect to the observed values’, turning
point. In other words, there is still only relative delinking. The economic meaning is unchanged.
The policy index is again not significant, while population density is. In this case, population
density is linked to a negative and economically and statistically significant coefficient (Ziliak and
McCloskey, [70]), suggesting that economies of scale related to agglomeration may have a
positive effect with respect to waste prevention. We recall that there are no a priori expectations
about this sign since opposite forces are at work; the corrected model changes (increases) the
significance threshold as a result of higher efficiency.18

Table 3 - Waste generated. SURE Model, constrained slopes.
Constrained slope SURE

Constrained slope SURE – all
variables

CONS

0.95***

1.19***

CONS2

-0.03***

-0.038***

DENSPOP

…

-0.29***

POLIND

…

-0.002

TP [CONS per capita, millions of €]

7.521

6.311

Breusch-Pagan test of independence
(chi2)

0.000

0.000

Note:. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.

17

As already mentioned, SURE refers only to 12 of the 15 countries. The countries with the lowest levels of waste
production, i.e. Luxembourg (330.473 Kg); Finland (2.675.416 Kg) and Ireland (3.389.645 Kg), were dropped from
the data set to allow SURE given the constraints. See Table A1 in the appendix for a general overview.
18 Some further estimates that constrain only CONS while leaving DENSPOP and POLIND unconstrained in
scope, show that 4 countries are characterized by a positive coefficient (+) for density: France, Greece, Italy, Sweden;
8 have a negative coefficient (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK. For
POLIND, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK show a positive sign while for
France, Germany, Greece, and Sweden the sign is negative.
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The last model we present for waste generation (Table 4) gives evidence of country
heterogeneity in the income/waste relationship at the EU15 level. The analysis refers only to the
main economic variable consumption.19 The main advantage, from an interpretative point of
view, is the possibility to compare the trends in different countries within the same framework of
analysis, which highlights common elements and discrepancies. For instance, Table 4 shows that
it is possible to split countries into three groupings: a first group includes Austria, Germany,
Greece, Portugal and Spain, characterized by the presence of absolute delinking. This result is as
expected for Austria and Germany, which are leaders in the waste sector and waste management
and show performances above the EU average. Germany’s national waste policy encourages
implementation of EU waste directives20. The evidence for the three other countries, is more
unexpected. From the graphical evidence plotted in the appendix figures, we believe that only
Spain can be associated with real absolute delinking, while Greece and Portugal show respectively
stabilization of waste generation, and an N shape which could derive partly from waste
accounting ‘data distortions’ in some years, a fact which is plausible in the waste arena.21 The
turning point is always inside the range, and relative at quite high levels of income, except in the
case of Germany, which is consistently associated with a very low turning point (1,633 €).
Germany preceded and influenced EU policy by achieving higher performance through diffuse
and stringent policy introduced in the early 1990s (EEA, [22]).

19

We attempted some estimates including DENSPOP and POLIND, which showed lower performance in terms of
statistical fit of the model.
20
Germany role and behavior depends on both a country real commitment on green strategies – waste and
renewables among others - and eco-innovations, often fostered by regulatory interventions and public funding, and
by idiosyncratic energy related country aspects. This green competitive advantage, though generating high national
compliance costs, it is also a driver of the high tech / green contents of german export leading performances in the
EU. An anecdote of Germany influence was the 1989 Toepfer law setting strict objectives on packaging waste
recycling and recovery and producer responsability, which drove the 1994 Packaging EU Directive given the
necessity of an homogenization of packaging laws to avoid trade distortions in the common market. On the energy
side, the commitment of Germany on renewables energy, waste recycling and eco innovations depend on the scarcity
of national sources. UK instead has placed lighter emphasis on recycling – mainly plastic - given the abundance of
oil. This is an endowment based reasoning that explains the value of investigating country specific evidence in detail.
All in all, Germany leadership is not undermined by this consideration: other countries such as Italy are not rich in
energy sources but adopted far lighter green strategies.
21 We refer the reader to Tables A2-3 in the Appendix, for graphical plots.
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A second group for countries, characterized by the presence of relative delinking, includes the
United Kingdom and The Netherlands. In this case there is a turning point, but it is out of the
possible range of income.
The remaining countries, in the third group, show no evidence of delinking, but with differences
among them. Coefficients are not highly significant for Belgium, Denmark22 and France, but
specific time series analysis conducted on these countries - not included here for reasons of space
- shows an increasing and significant relationship.23 Italy and Sweden show a U shaped
relationship, characterized by a clear positive marginal effect. Overall, the tendency in this last
group is for an increasing relationship between waste and income.
To summaries, SURE analyses are only able to identify differences across European countries
that are hidden in the fixed effects estimation. In particular we see that, letting the slopes free to
move across the different individual countries, we can categorise countries in three groups, based
on the big differences among them. From a statistical point of view this result is also confirmed
by the F test presented in the final line of Table 4, which confirms that letting the slopes move
freely across countries provides more valuable information.24

22

Denmark performance may be influenced by the fact that construction and demolition waste were recently
accounted as MSW. This shows how data commensurability is an issue in waste statistics. Within EU15 data
commensurability is good, while data availability and commensurability are two points that for the time being does
not allow a full integration of EU12 countries into the analysis.
23 Analogously, an unconstrained SURE with only consumption as the main economic driver shows a statistically
significant and positive relationship between income and waste generated. These results are not shown for reasons of
space, but confirm the absence of delinking for Belgium, Denmark and Finland.
24 The test follows an F statistic, and tests the hypothesis of slope homogeneity (under the null).
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Tab 4 - Waste generated. SURE Model, unconstrained model
Countries

CONS

CONS2

TP [€]

Austria

84.31***

-4.33***

16,646.52

Absolute

Belgium

-3.73

0.210

7,075.36

No delinking

Denmark

-11.26

0.62

8,051.13

France

3.57

-0.17

33,767.68

Germany

1.89***

-0.12***

1,633.113

Greece

17.36***

-0.91***

13,548.99

Italy

-8.73***

0.487***

7,842.28

The Netherlands

9.28***

-0.47***

16,578.1

Portugal

8.89***

-0.48***

9,983.131

Spain

24.03***

-1.29***

10,885.79

Sweden

-17.5***

0.96***

8,700.899

United Kingdom

5.09***

-0.25***

21,529.84

Breusch-Pagan test of independence (chi2) = 0.000

Delinking evidence

No delinking
No delinking
Absolute
Absolute
No delinking
Relative
Absolute
Absolute
No delinking
Relative

F test of slope homogeneity = 0.000

Note:. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; SURE estimations refers
only to 12 countries. Breusch-Pagan tests for cross-sectional independence in the residuals, while the F test is a test of slope
homogeneity.

Some countries were able, during the period analysed, to reduce the amount of waste and to
change the income environment relationship, promoting a process of delinking, driven by
structural and policy factors. At the same time, some other countries show an increasing
relationship, in which an increase in income is combining with an increasing trend in total
amount of waste generated.25 This evidence, which will be become more robust in future years
from adding years to the already valuable EU waste time series, in our view should be very useful

25

From a different but complementary perspective, we calculate the delinking indexes following the OECD [60]
formula, which we present in the appendix (Fig A1). (SURE) econometric analysis is definitely a more robust way to
assess delinking.
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for the EU Commission and member states in transition for fixing a set of country diversified
targets and policy tools on waste generation, under the umbrella of the waste framework directive
and EU regulatory guideline.

3.2 Waste landfilled
The relationship was hypothesised to be bell-shaped, in accordance with the previsions of the
more traditional WKC studies. In fact, on average, although some EU15 countries are still
increasing their share of landfill26 – due to policy failure and land-based idiosyncratic features,
and heterogeneity is rather striking across Europe (figure 2), shares of landfilled waste have been
constantly decreasing since the mid 1990s, when EUROSTAT data began to be collected.
Therefore, we can expect to find a bell shape or even a strictly negative relationship in the
turning points for most countries.
This expectation is confirmed by the following results, suggesting that from an EU average
viewpoint, the period 1995-2007 is already on the descending side of the inverted U-shape
relationship, as far as the relationship between landfill and economic growth is concerned. The
estimation results presented in Table 5 confirm the presence of an absolute delinking, with a
turning point corresponding to relatively low levels of income (turning point varies between
6,976€ and 12,637€ across specifications). Moving to the additional covariates, we see that
population density is never significant. This result is counterintuitive; we would expect
population density to be a proxy for the opportunity (economic) cost of land, and for this
reason highly correlated to landfill diversion. Nevertheless, previous studies (Mazzanti et al.,
[52]) based on a shorter dataset find similar results for European countries, while they find a

26

Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and surprisingly Denmark and the Netherlands, actually show a U shape, where the
lowest peak around 2005 is followed by slight increase in landfilling (a recoupling in technical terms) over 2006-2007,
which is sound to some extent, given that these were two years of robust economic growth. Recall that the social
benefit cost ratio of landfilling relative to other options is highly idiosyncratic (Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, [19]).
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negative significant relationship between population density and waste landfilled in a wider
EU25 analysis.
The inclusion of socio economic and policy drivers does not alter the results of the core
specification, but adds some interesting elements. Regarding the policy proxy, both
environmental taxation effect27 and the waste policy index are statistically significant.28 This
means that the policy efforts implemented so far at national level, have promoted a stronger
delinking between waste landfilled and domestic consumption.
Tab 5- Landfilled Waste: Fixed effects model
FEM

FEM

FEM

FEM

CONS
CONS2
DENSPOP
POLIND
EMS
ENVTAX

32.65**
-1.82**
5.23
…
…
…

23.80**
-1.26**
3.11
-1.64***
…
…

16.06**
-0.92**
1.66
…
5.92
…

31.33**
-1.77**
6.71
…
…
-0.74**

TP [€]
Pesaran test
F test

7,86187
0.0353
0.0000

12,637.76
0.0141
0.0000

…
0.0255
0.0000

6,976.3
0.0447
0.0000

Note: In all the estimation we use. the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance and adjusted for correlations in the error terms over time
within individuals (but not across individuals). This means that we consider that Var(εit) = σ2εit i=1,.., N, t=1,…,T, and that Cov(εit, εis) ≠ 0
t
≠ s. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; F test shows overall significance for all
regressions; R-squared presents reasonably high values for panel settings. EMAS data are available only for the period 1997-2007, and the EMAS
estimation does not include Germany because it is a strong outlier. Environmental tax data are not available for year 1995.

This is an important result because it underlines the potentially high level of effectiveness of –
decentralised - European policy, in terms of diverting waste from landfill. Policies help in the
effort to tunnel through the business-as-usual,

endogenous delinking trend that is driven by

economic drivers. Only EMAS do not have a significant coefficient, which is evidence that a high
number rate of certificated firms and technologies is still not associated with better performances
of waste management and disposal.

27 Recall that environmental taxation net of energy is mostly landfill taxation, around 80% of that for example in
Italy.
28 Since we suspected the presence endogeneity of policy commitment with regard to income levels, we
implemented three different consistency tests, presented in the Appendix in Table A3. The first two respectively
use the first and the second lags of POLIND as the policy proxy, the third includes POLIND instrumented with its
lag. The tests confirmed the results obtained in the main analysis.
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Even for landfilling the results of the Pesaran and Breusch-Pagan tests confirm the presence of
contemporaneous correlations across cross-sectional units. Table 6 summarises the results for the
constrained SURE.29 The core specification confirms our previous result of absolute delinking,
but with an even lower turning point (1,659.39€). In terms of averages, this mean that 1995-2007
is already along the descending side of the inverted U-shape relationship.

Table 6 – SUR: landfilled waste
Constrained SUR

Constrained SUR – all covariates

CONS

1.49***

4.27***

CONS2

-0.10***

DENSPOP

…

-3.68***

POLIND

…

-0.82***

TP [€]

1,659.39

47,328.06

Breusch-Pagan test of independence (chi2)

0.000

0.000

-0.19***

Note:. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; SURE estimations refers only to 12
countries.

New and more interesting elements emerge from the other specifications, again showing the
presence of a delinking trend, but this time associated with a high and out of range turning point
(47,328€, while the income range is 5,700-28,400€). This specification also sheds new light on the
variable population density, which now is highly significant from both an economic and statistical
point of view (the size of the parameter is larger than in the waste generation case, higher than 3)
and negatively related to landfilled waste. Both the opportunity costs linked to the higher value of
land in densely populated and urban areas (value of land, of commercial activities a crowded out
by landfill sites, and other public investments), and the higher externality costs in more densely
populated areas, ceteris paribus, seem to be driving down the use of landfill as a disposal option.

29

As before, SURE refers only to 12 of the 15 countries. The countries with the lowest levels of waste to landfill, i.e.
Luxembourg (61.904 Kg); Sweden (191.378 Kg) and Belgium (222.275 Kg), are dropped.
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Moreover, the policy index is again significant and associated with a negative coefficient of
relevant size. This new insight, combined with the high significance of the policy related variable,
probably explain the progression from the previous strong absolute delinking to the relative
delinking found in this last specification. To summarise, the use of a constrained SURE model in
this analysis would suggest that the baseline income waste relationship does not on its own
explain landfill diversion. Other forces, such as population density, impact on waste performance.
This does not infringe the core evidence we found to support the general effectiveness of
environmental and waste policy efforts in driving down disposal by landfill.
Finally, Table 7 presents the results of the fully unconstrained SURE model. The regression
results generally confirm the previous evidence of a bell-shaped income-landfill diversion
relationship, with the exceptions of Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark – three cases of
relatively worse performance envisaged above. All the other countries analysed show an absolute
delinking in the waste income relationship over the considered period.
In Denmark and the Netherlands, although in both countries there is geographical space for
landfilling, the U shape seems to be capturing some statistical irregularities (see figures A2-3)
within a still clear absolute delinking over the entire period.30 Spain is the only case that does not
show a clear ‘marginal effect’, that is more in line with the evidence of relative delinking. In other
words, the size of the two estimated coefficients leads to a calculated weight of CONS and
CONS2 biased towards the former. This is the only case where the turning point is within the
estimated range.
The country specific evidence from the SURE model shows its potential for interpreting ex post
dynamics and informing future policy. The threat of a recoupling is looming even for countries
with relatively good performance.

30

The TP for Denmark and The Netherlands is slightly outside the range of values. Delinking is thus absolute.
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Table 7 - Unconstrained SUR - landfilled waste
CONS

CONS2

TP [€]

Delinking

Austria

3.71***

-0.33***

269.7

Absolute

Denmark

-120.6***

6.05***

21,160

Absolute

Finland

43.74***

-2.32***

12,296.32

Absolute

France

84.01***

-4.45***

12,358.26

Absolute

Germany

12.97***

-1.3***

142.27

Absolute

Greece

17.38***

-0.92***

12,210.49

Absolute

Ireland

15.59***

-0.82***

12,204.52

Absolute

Italy

22.7***

-1.25***

8,642.7

Absolute

The Netherlands

-144.14**

7.28**

19,837.1

Absolute

Portugal

40.9***

-2.27***

8,052.68

Absolute

Spain

-10.14***

0.54***

10,209.04

Relative

United Kingdom

48.21***

-2.54***

12,930.44

Absolute

Breusch-Pagan test of independence (chi2) = 0.000,
F test of slope homogeneity = 0.000
Note:. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; SURE estimations refers
only to 12 countries. Breusch-Pagan tests for cross-sectional independence in the residuals, while the F test is a test of slope
homogeneity.

3.3 Simulating policy effects
Along similar lines as in Cole et al. [15], we explore as a final investigation the effect of what
could have occurred to the delinking process if structural and policy variables were in 1995 at
their 2007 level. Using a two stage procedure, it is possible to asses the degree to which 1995
waste generation and waste landfilled quantities would have changed, if the three main variables
were at their 2007 level, holding the other variables constant. We calculated the predicted values
of our core relationships using 1995 data, and in the second step, we replaced 1995 data relative
to the three variables of interest (policy index, population density and environmental taxation
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over consumption) with their 2007 values. In this way, it is possible to measure the effect of 2007
regulation and population density on 1995 waste indicators.
Table 8 indicates that the effect of the policy indicator is positive and associated to a negative
sign in both cases, but with a higher coefficient in the case of landfilled waste. This is an expected
result, considering that previous models underlined that policy index is strongly related to waste
landfilled but is not able to promote landfill prevention. In other terms, we can read this result as
the effect of 2007 regulation on 1995 waste performances, coming to the conclusion that a
stronger regulation would have had a significant effect in reducing the amount of waste landfilled.
A different and probably unexpected result, is given by the environmental tax, that shows a
positive result for both MSW generated and Landfilled. Even though these results may seems
counterintuitive, given the strong link found up to date between regulation and waste
performances, we have to note here that the level of environmental taxation with respect to
income has a decreasing path over the time period analysed, i.e. the share of environmental
taxation on income is lower in 2007 than in 1995. This is a well known fact in the EU policy
arena: environmental and energy taxes have shown stable or decreasing paths on average, with
many countries witnessing reductions in real terms. In other terms, the results in the previous
table stress the importance of environmental regulation, showing that 2007 taxation (slightly
lower than 1995 level) has a positive effect on 1995 level of both waste generated and waste
landfilled. Analogously, the results for population density show a positive relationship in the case
of waste generation and a negative one in the case of waste to landfill, in line with previous result.
Summarizing, we have seen here that policy levers has definitely been on of the main responsible
of the process of landfill diversion, and that a stringent regulation starting from 1995 would have
reduced the amount of waste landfilled quite consistently.
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Table 8 – Simulation effects
MSW GENER

MSW LAND

POLIND

-0.0161

-1.006

ENVTAX

0.0210

0.0905

DENSPOP

0.0432

-0.2599

Results are statistically significant and are calculated using fixed effect predicted values.

4. Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on the socio economic and policy drivers of two main
waste variables, waste generation and landfill diversion, by exploiting a fairly long and highly
original, country-based, panel dataset for the EU15. The environment is relevant given the
increasing strictness of waste policies in the EU, promoted by Germany’s leadership since the
mid 1990s. We focus on the period 1995-2007 since there is good availability of data. The lens we
use is mainly ex post effectiveness of policy action, but we also look at the future in relation to
the current transition in the implementation of waste prevention policy targets in addition to the
already adopted disposal based (landfill diversion) and management based (recycling and
recovery) targets.
Given the strong decentralization of environmental policy in the EU, use of the SURE model
is coherent with the need to investigate both average EU performance and national trends in
waste-income performance and the effectiveness of waste and environmental policies more
generally.
The evidence shows that although waste generation-income macroeconomic elasticity has
decreased compared to several years ago, neither environmental taxes nor specific waste policy
efforts have produced substantial ‘absolute delinking’. As expected and in line with currently
available forecasting figures, waste generation is increasing. Given that member states must
propose new waste strategies by 2013, including specific waste prevention targets, we need to
take urgent action on how to shape efficient and effective policies targeted at reducing waste
27
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generated per GDP and per capita, in order to complement established but evidently not
sufficient waste management and disposal targets.
It should be noted that SURE, as expected, increases efficiency while not affecting
substantially the economic meaning of the results, and also that population density seems to drive
down waste generation. This should be taken into account in considering the relationship
between endogenous changes such as increasing urbanization and waste generation. Although it
enhances the statistical significance of density, the more efficient estimation provided by SURE
does not change the result that environmental and waste policy actions are ineffective. Even
more market based actions, such as diffusion of EMS in a country, possibly related to its waste
and material reduction strategy, seem to be ineffective. However, the EU situation is highly
dynamic, and shows increased adoption of environmental policies in recent years, but still with
Germany as an absolute outlier and most of the rest of Europe lagging far behind.
In terms of the possibility of identifying ‘groupings’ of countries through the unconstrained
SURE procedures, we find that EU15 waste generation–income relationship encompasses three
main groups: the first is Austria, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain, characterized by the
presence of absolute delinking. This result is as expected based on the fact that Austria and
Germany are leaders in the waste sector and in waste management and show performances above
the EU average. The presence in this group of the three other countries is surprising. We believe
that only Spain can be associated to a real absolute delinking, while Greece and Portugal show
stabilization in waste generation, and an N shape respectively. The second group of countries,
which is characterized by the presence of a relative delinking, is composed of the United
Kingdom and The Netherlands.
The remaining countries show no evidence of delinking, but with differences among them. Italy
and Sweden show a U shaped relationship, characterized by a clear positive marginal effect.
Overall, the tendency in this last group is towards an increasing relationship between waste and
income.
28
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The picture is different for landfilled waste. For most countries, a turning point was achieved in
the Mid 1990s. We find that environmental tax – mainly based on landfill taxation – and pure
waste based national strategies captured by the policy index affect landfill diversion with an
economic and statistical high significance. The EU strategy based mainly on disposal targets,
which was implemented by the Landfill Directive in 1999, and some anticipatory action by more
virtuous countries (Nordic countries, Germany) is being effective. However, it is not having an
effect on the core issue of preventing waste from being produced.
Population density, as expected, is a significant structural factor driving down landfilled waste, for
reasons associated with to the often very high economic opportunity costs of landfill sites and the
higher environmental social costs in densely populated areas. The economic significance of
estimated coefficients is comparatively higher with regard its effect on waste generation, than on
landfilling, in the end.
A bell shaped income-landfill diversion relationship emerges for all countries, except Spain, the
Netherlands, and Denmark. If for Denmark and the Netherlands, though both countries may
possess land space for landfilling, the U shape seems capturing more statistical irregularities
within a still clear absolute delinking over the entire period, Spain is the only case showing a not
clear ‘marginal effect’, more in line with an evidence of relative delinking. Nevertheless, we
highlight that our results suggest as real the possibility of recoupling which may be relevant also
for countries with relatively good environmental performance over the past. For instance, the
evidence we capture for Denmark and The Netherlands may drive the attention on a potential
future real recoupling.
Future research could extend waste economics by focusing on unexplored issues such as
transboundary shipments of waste, which would overlap the trade and environmental policy
fields, the spatial dimensions of waste flows across countries and within regions, new assessments
and policy indicators, the influence of socio-demographic trends in forecasting scenarios, the role
of the waste market structure in explaining waste related performance, and differences between
29
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advanced countries such as the EU15, and EU transition economies that are only entering the
sphere of marked based environmental policy.
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Appendix
A1 - Waste generated and waste landfilled (kg)

Table A2 – fixed effects estimates with policy lags and IV: waste generation
Lagged estimation
CONS
DENSPOP
POLIND (lag1)
POLIND (lag2)
POLIND

0,38***
0,05
-0,04
…
…

IV estimation

0,35***
0,04
…
-0,04
…

0,39***
0,05
…
…
-0,05

Table A3- fixed effects estimates with policy lags and IV: landfilled waste
Lagged estimation
CONS
CONS2
DENSPOP
POLIND (lag1)
POLIND (lag2)
POLIND
TP

20.13***
-1.07***
3.53
-1.70***
…
…
12,167.72

15.39
-0.81
3.88
…
-1.83***
…
13,359.73

IV estimation
21.95***
-1.15***
3.35
…
…
-2.10***
13,953.40
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Figure A1 – Delinking indexes for waste generation and landfilling – OECD (2002)
Waste generation

Landfilling
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Figure A2- Waste generation vs consumption per capita
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Figure A3- Waste landfilled vs consumption per capita
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